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We utilize a unique pair of experiments to study the precise ways in which reductions in asymmetric 
information alter the outcome in a credit market.  We formulate a general model in which the 
information set held by lenders, and what borrowers believe their lenders to know, enter separately.  
This model illustrates that non-experimental identification of the supply- and demand-side 
information in a market will be confounded.  We then present a unique natural experiment, wherein a 
Guatemalan credit bureau was implemented without the knowledge of borrowers, and subsequently 
borrowers were given a randomized course describing the existence and workings of the bureau.  
Using this pairing of randomized and natural experiment, we find that the most powerful effect of 
new information in the hands of lenders is seen on the extensive margin, in their ability to select 
better clients.  Changes in contracts for ongoing borrowers are muted.  When borrower in group 
loans learn that their lender possesses this new information set, on the other hand, we see strong 
responses on both the intensive margin (changes in moral hazard) and the extensive margin (groups 
changing their composition to improve performance).  We find some evidence that disadvantaged and 
female borrowers are disproportionately impacted.  Our results indicate that credit bureaus allow for 
large efficiency gains, that these gains are augmented when borrowers understand the rules of the 
game, and that economic mobility both upwards and downwards is likely to be increased. 
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  It has long been understood that asymmetric information plays a central role in 
determining credit market equilibria (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981).  Particularly in developing 
countries, where many borrowers lack credit histories and informal information-sharing 
mechanisms predominate, information problems may present a major obstacle to economic 
efficiency and mobility.  This paper presents a unique confluence of data and identification in 
order to conduct an in-depth analysis of the ways in which a key institutional innovation, 
namely a credit bureau, has altered equilibrium lending outcomes.   for one of Guatemala’s 
largest microfinance lenders.  We use the administrative data of one of Guatemala’s largest 
microfinance lenders, as well as data from the new credit bureau which gives the behavior of 
all of these clients with other lenders.  From these data we can assemble a comprehensive 
picture, not only of how the bureau alters behavior with a given lender, but with the credit 
system as a whole.   
The second novel feature of this study is that the bureau was introduced in a 
staggered fashion without the knowledge of the borrowers.  A year later, we conducted a 
large randomized educational campaign in which we instructed borrowers on the ways in 
which the bureau works, and the repercussions for their future access to credit.  Hence we 
observe improvements in lender information and the corresponding changes in borrower 
behavior at different times.  The resulting ability to disentangle the supply- and demand-side 
effects of information on credit market equilibria is, to our knowledge, unique to the 
literature.   
Microfinance markets provide a good environment in which to look for natural 
experiments in the use of information.  Because of a rapid increase in sophistication in these 
markets, they offer much starker changes in information-sharing agreements than developed 
credit markets, which typically have been sharing information for many years.  The 
“microfinance revolution” has allowed poor people to gain access to loans even if they did 
not own assets that they could pledge as collateral (Morduch, 1999; Morduch and 
Armendariz de Aghion, 2005).  As in any time-delayed transaction, success of the 
microfinance contracts requires that the lender be able to control adverse selection and moral 
hazard.  Early microfinance lending operating in geographically monopolistic contexts could 
partially resolve this problem through the repetition of exchange with privately held   
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reputation and dynamic incentives. Rising competition among lenders without information 
sharing, however, increasingly undermined the power of dynamic incentives, and disrupted 
this equilibrium.  The response to this change, in several developing countries, has been to 
introduce credit bureaus which share information about borrowers repayment behavior and 
outstanding debts.  In so doing, privately held information about reputation and indebtedness 
has been made public, leading to sharp changes in credit market equilibria and potential 
benefits for the two sides of the transaction.  
In this paper, we take advantage of a rare opportunity to analyze this transformation 
of microfinance lending as reputation and information become public by combining a natural 
experiment with a randomized experiment.  The natural experiment emerged when entry of a 
microfinance lender (Genesis Empresarial) into a credit bureau (Crediref) was done in a 
staggered fashion over the course of 18 months without informing borrowers that their 
behavior was being reported to the bureau.  In this early phase, the credit bureau was thus 
only used by the lender as a client selection device.  Subsequent to this, we set up a 
randomized experiment wherein we selectively informing jointly liable clients about how their 
lenders share information through a credit bureau system and the implications this can have 
for them.  In this second phase we examine how Solidarity Groups (smaller groups with 
larger loans) and Communal Banks (larger groups with smaller loans) adjusted their behavior 
upon selectively learning of the existence of the credit bureau and its workings.   
We find significant effects of informational changes on both the supply and demand 
side of the market.  As might be expected, the strongest effect of improved information in 
the hands of lenders is seen through the screening of new clients, particularly individuals, and 
the ability to increase loan volumes faster than would otherwise have been the case.  The 
bureau also causes a dramatic increase in the expulsion of existing clients.  On the demand 
side, informing group members about the implications of a credit bureau induced a better 
repayment performance among members of solidarity groups, both through reduction in 
moral hazard and improved selection by the groups themselves. This demonstrates that credit 
bureaus are an efficient institutional innovation not only in assisting client selection by 
lenders and group borrowers alike, but that additional improvements are realized when 
borrowers clearly understand the implications of information sharing arrangements. 
Borrowers with good credit records are also able to take advantage of this information   
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sharing to get access to more loans outside Genesis. However, use of reputation to access 
additional loans was differentially successful across categories of borrowers. It induced the 
more experienced clients to improve their credit records, but not the less experienced ones 
who in fact worsened their records when they exuberantly seized the opportunities opened to 
them by information sharing across lenders to increase their levels of indebtedness with 
outside lenders. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we provide background information 
on the transformations of microfinance lending leading to the emergence of credit bureaus, 
and Section III describes our paired experiments in more detail.  Section IV presents a simple 
model of the two-sided selection process that generates the pool of individuals who receive 
loans, and the effects of this selection on estimates of the conditional mean.  Section V 
analyzes the impact of improved information on the supply side through the staggered rollout 
of Crediref, and Section VI gives the corresponding changes when demand-side information 
improves. Section VII concludes on the impact of credit bureau information on borrower 
behavior. 
 
II. EVOLUTION OF COMPETITION IN MICROFINANCE LENDING  
 
Microfinance markets provide an interesting forum in which to examine the effects of 
asymmetric information for several reasons.  First, limited borrower liability exposes lenders 
to levels of adverse selection and moral hazard not seen in markets which rely on formal 
collateral.  Second, the use of joint liability contracts for those borrowers who take group 
loans creates an intricate strategic dynamic between groups and lenders, each of whom bear 
some risk in the extension of loans to individual members.  Finally, the explosive growth of 
microfinance itself means that markets in many developing countries have gone from near-
monopoly to vibrant competition in the course of the past decade or so. As these markets 
mature, we typically see certain group members seeking larger loans than the joint liability 
system can credibly cover, and the inexorable drift towards greater competition and more 
individualized lending put a premium on mechanisms such as credit bureaus which allow 
lenders to adapt to these new realities.  We now sketch this process of credit market 
evolution to place credit bureaus in context. 
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2.1. NON-COMPETITIVE LENDING 
Under the lender monopolies that characterized the early years of microfinance 
lending, several mechanisms were developed to solve problems of asymmetric information.  
Dynamic incentives were used to solve the moral hazard problem.  This was done by making 
sure that borrowers were always kept credit constrained by the only loan supplier, and that a 
reputation of good repayment behavior would guarantee access to larger future loans. 
  Both moral hazard and adverse selection could be mitigated through the use of group 
lending, where the limited liability rule would induce members to engage in group self-
selection & self-monitoring, making use of the local information available to them (Besley & 
Coate, 1995, Ghatak & Guinnane 1999).  For individual loans, the adverse selection problem 
remained problematic.  It was partially remedied by delegating selection to credit agents with 
access to local information, and giving them incentives to seek this information, reveal it 
truthfully to the lender, and align their objectives on those of the institution. 
  The insurance problem in taking loans, even without having to put collateral at risk, 
could also be partially solved through group lending.  The joint liability rule implied that 
group members had an incentive to insure each others repayments.  In principle, the 
insurance problem remained unaddressed for individual loans.  In practice, for both 
individual and group loans, it was in the best interest of the lender to provide some kind of 
insurance for verifiable shocks.  Thus, the repayment schedules on individual loans, and the 
joint liability rules on group lending, were not strictly enforced under all circumstances. 
  Joint liability contracts come under increasing strain as heterogeneity in loan sizes 
within a group increases.  Further, those borrowers who take the largest loans generate the 
largest lender profits, and so new lending products were typically developed which allowed 
for ‘internal graduation’ to smaller groups, and eventually to individual loans.  This opened up 
the possibility to cross-subsidize poorer clients with these large borrowers, but began to 
undermine group mechanisms in older, better-established lenders. 
 
2.2. COMPETITION WITHOUT INFORMATION SHARING 
  The world of monopoly lending was soon undermined by entry of other lenders 
attracted by the industry’s high profit rates. Rising created some negative effects for the 
incumbent lenders. It weakened the use of dynamic incentives to control moral hazard, as   
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borrowers could find other sources of loans.  It also worsened the adverse selection problem 
as information was not shared among lenders, allowing borrowers to hide bad repayment 
behavior and to over-borrow by cumulating many small loans from different sources.
1  And it 
weakened the possibility of cross-subsidization as better borrowers were snatched by 
competitors, canceling the source of rents that could be used for subsidies.  At the same time, 
the better borrowers could still not move up the credit ladder toward better contracts as 
information on their reputation remained captive with the incumbent lender.  It is in this 
context that many lenders organized to share information about their clients repayment 
performance (negative information) and also about levels of indebtedness with each of them 
(positive information). This is how credit bureaus were born and the practice of microfinance 
lending under public information was introduced. 
The decision for a lender to join a credit information sharing system among a group 
of lenders involves a complex set of tradeoffs (Padilla & Pagano 1997).  The benefits of 
doing so are a decrease in portfolio risk (Campion & Valenzuela, 2001), preventing clients 
from taking multiple loans and thus hiding their true indebtedness (McIntosh & Wydick, 
2005) and the preservation of reputation effects during long-term lending relationships with 
clients (Vercammen 1995).  The incentives to share information are also closely related to the 
level of competition; even if we do not see the kind of collapse of repayment quality 
predicted in Hoff & Stiglitz (1998), not only is the need to screen clients likely to increase 
with competition (Villas-Boas & Schmidt-Mohr, 1999), but the dispersion of information that 
results from a larger number of lenders makes it more difficult to do so.  The interesting 
strategic tension arises because the advantage conferred on incumbents by a lack of 
information sharing can be an effective method for preventing entry (Marquez, 2001).  Hence 
we are likely to see information sharing emerge as a strategic equilibrium only where lenders 
face a large pool of mobile, heterogeneous borrowers, and when the incumbents are relatively 
unconcerned about new entry (Pagano & Japelli, 1993). 
 
 
                                            
1 Nonetheless, McIntosh et al (2006) show that informal information-sharing agreements were able to prevent 
the wholesale collapse of credit markets which would have followed from competition under certain theoretical 
frameworks, such as Hoff & Stiglitz (1998).   
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2.3. COMPETITION WITH INFORMATION SHARING 
  With the introduction of a credit bureau allowing the sharing of positive information 
among lenders, the adverse selection problem could be partially resolved for the lender, 
especially in individual loans.  Information sharing should help prevent clients from taking 
multiple loans and thus hiding their true indebtedness (McIntosh & Wydick, 2005). Moral 
hazard should also be held in check as new incentives were introduced for borrowers to 
improve their repayment performance that now influences access to loans across the whole 
participating microfinance industry (Vercammen, 1995).  Information sharing should thus be 
a major source of efficiency gains for lenders (Jappelli & Pagano, 1999; Campion & 
Valenzuela, 2001).  Improved performance should also open new opportunities to access 
more and better loans from others than the lender with whom reputation had been privately 
earned. This public information would allow good borrowers to shop for larger and cheaper 
loans, thus moving up the credit ladder on the basis of information about their past good 
behavior (Galindo & Miller, 2001).  
Because lender profit cannot decrease from knowing more, a lenders want to join a 
bureau to learn what the other lender knows, but fears suffering from the response when the 
other lender learns. Nothing is lost by sharing information on bad clients to whom one would 
never lend again, whereas sharing information on one’s most profitable clients carries great 
risk.  For these reasons we expect negative information-sharing agreements to be easier to 
form than positive agreements.   
The costs of introducing a bureau can be illustrated through casting this new 
information as a variant of the ‘Hirshleifer effect’ (Hirshleifer 1971).  This refers to the 
situation in which the willingness to extend insurance can be eroded by the improvement of 
ex ante information.  Since the willingness to extend limited-liability credit is tantamount to an 
insurance offer both by the lender and the group, reduction in the uncertainty over future 
borrower outcomes will certainly exclude certain individuals from the borrower pool, and 
may also result in an increase in the homogeneity of borrower groups.  Hence while market 
efficiency will in general be enhanced, agents who were receiving implicit insurance through a   
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lack of information, and those on whom the bureau contains negative information, will be 
harmed.
2   
 
III. THE GUATEMALA CASE:  A RANDOMIZED AND A NATURAL EXPERIMENT. 
  In this section we give a brief outline of the institutions and contexts which allowed 
us to set up our paired experiments. 
Guatemala’s microfinance credit bureau, Crediref, was formed by five of the largest 
members of Redimif, the national association of MFIs.  The impetus was concern over a 
rising level of default in the client base, and agreement by the three institutions that dominate 
microfinance lending in the capital city (Genesis, BanCafe, and Banrural) to all enter the 
credit bureau.
3   Concerns over use of the system for client cherry-picking among each others 
or by new entrants were alleviated through several simple mechanisms.  First, only 
institutions that share information into Crediref are allowed to consult it, with the exception 
of a six-month trial period during which reduced-price checks can be run by prospective 
entrants.  Secondly, the system does not allow users to identify the lender who issued the 
loan.  To prevent lenders from using act of receiving credit from a high-tier lender as a 
quality signal, it is institutionally anonymous.  Further, as mentioned, for group lending, only 
the total loan size and repayment performance are reported.  By restricting the information 
observable, then, Crediref was able to overcome the strategic obstacles to the formation of a 
bureau.  Since its inception in 2002, the bureau has continued to grow and now contains data 
from eight different lenders.
4 
Genesis extends loans to individuals, and to two types of groups:  solidarity groups 
(SG), which number 3-5 people and feature relatively large loans; and communal banks (CB), 
with upwards of 30 people and small loans.  The logic of borrower and group behavior is 
quite different in the two types of groups.  Accordingly, the response to information about 
the role of a credit bureau can also be expected to be quite different.  In CBs, loans are 
completely uncollateralized and so MFIs commonly used dynamic incentives to keep clients 
credit constrained and hence holding a high future valuation for the relationship with the 
                                            
2 See ‘The Economics of Privacy’, Posner (1981) for a more general treatment. 
3 BanCafe and Banrural are both national full-service banks which only share microlending information in 
Crediref, and not information from their commercial banking divisions.  
4 For an analysis of the impacts of the lenders’ use of Crediref, see Luoto et al. (2005).   
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lender.  Internal control of behavior is difficult due to the large size of the group, loans are 
very small, group members have few other borrowing options inside Genesis, and their low 
asset endowments also severely limit their access to loans from other lenders. The situation is 
quite different in SGs.  For them, internal control is made easier by the small size of the 
group, and the use of collateral and cosigning is common.  While SG clients have access to 
much larger loans, they are also likely to be more informed about and attractive to outside 
lenders who will offer lower rates than an MFI on these high-volume loans.  As the size of 
SGs decreases, the incentives become more similar to those under individual lending. 
  Genesis has 39 branches distributed over most of Guatemala.  For technical reasons, 
it staggered the entry of its branches into Crediref over the period between March 2002 and 
January 2003.  In addition, Genesis’ clientele remained unaware of the existence and use of 
Crediref both in reporting information to other lenders and in checking credit records for 
client selection.
5  Group lending clients were made selectively aware of the existence and 
implications of a credit bureau through randomized information sessions that we organized 
over the period June to November 2004.  For logistical reasons, we trained only SGs and CBs 
and not individual borrowers.  This gave us a unique two-stage transition into microfinance 
lending under private and shared information. 
Given the lack of information among Genesis clients about the existence and 
implications of a credit bureau, we designed a course to be administered by the Genesis in-
house training staff.  The design of the materials presented a challenge because nearly 50% of 
the Genesis clients are illiterate.  We drew on experience from the training office and from 
the faculty of Universidad Rafael Landivar in order to develop materials that were primarily 
pictographic.  We used the logos of the different lending institutions in combination with 
diagrams showing the flow of money and information in the lending process to illustrate 
when Genesis shares information on the clients and when it checks them in the bureau.  The 
key focus of the information was to reinforce the fact that repayment performance with any 
one lender now has greater repercussions than previously.  This point was made both in a 
negative fashion (meaning that repayment problems with any participating lender will 
                                            
5 See Luoto et al (2007) for details.   
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decrease options with other lenders) and in a positive fashion (emphasizing the greater 
opportunities now available for climbing the ‘credit ladder’ for those who repay well).
6 
In Section 5 we present results from the staggered entry, which changed lender 
information, and in Section 6 we discuss the impacts of the improvement of borrower 
understanding of the system.  In order to organize thoughts, we first present a simple model 
of the two-sided selection process through which the pool of borrowers is determined. 
 
IV. OBSERVED CREDIT MARKET OUTCOMES 
Let f be a credit market outcome (loan sizes, repayment rates, probability of becoming 
a long-term client, and so on) defined on all potential borrowers.   Z represents characteristics 
of the potential borrower that are observable as of the time of application, and X represents 
information over borrower quality that becomes observable as the lender has increasing 
experience with a given borrower.  a represents characteristics that are private information to 
the potential borrowers, α  is the information observed in the bureau, and 
B α is what the 
borrower believes the lender to see. (Even though 
B α  is most likely equal to α , it will be 
useful later on to distinguish them.)   Lenders attempt to use the information that they can 
observe (Z, α , and potentially X) to proxy for a.  We can write the observed outcome as: 
  () ,, , ,
B ff Z X a αα = , 
where f can be thought of either as the terms of a contract (loan sizes, interest rates) or the 
outcome of this contract (repayment rates, probability of continuing as a borrower). 
 
4.1.  BORROWER BEHAVIOR 
  Without moral hazard, a potential borrower’s behavior would strictly depend on his 
characteristics and the terms of the loan contract.  Under moral hazard on the part of the 
borrower, his behavior also depends on the information that the lenders have on him, or 
more precisely his knowing the information that the lenders have on him.  Letting 
B π  the 
latent variable underlying the decision by the borrower to apply for a loan, this can be 
formalized as follows: 
                                            
6 As a cautionary tale of the unpredictable consequences of training programs, Schreiner (1999) finds that the 
randomized Unemployment Insurance Self-Employment Demonstration actually discouraged the most 
disadvantaged from entering self-employment.   
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  () ,,
B BB Za ππ α = . 
 
4.2.  LENDER BEHAVIOR 
  From the applicant pool, a lender will select a borrower if his expected return from 
extending him a loan is positive.    The return to the loan essentially depends on the 
borrower’s behavior, i.e. is function of the borrower’s characteristics Z  and a and, if there is 
moral hazard behavior on the part of the borrower, on 
B α  (the lender knows what the 
borrower thinks the lender knows).  However, the lender does not observe a, and hence 
needs to rely on the signal α  to make the selection decision.  Let 
L π  be the latent variable 
underlying the decision process; although the selection process follows this recursive 
structure, we define 
L π  over all potential borrowers: 
  () ,,
LL B Z ππ α α = . 
With the use of two different notations for the signal itself, α , and the borrower’s 
information on that signal, 
B α , we clearly see that the signal influences the lender decision in 
two ways.  First, the lender uses the signal as a proxy for the true unobserved quality of the 
borrower, and second, the lender takes into account the fact that the borrower may behave 
strategically in response to the existence of a public signal on his quality.   
  We can visualize the selection induced by the bureau from the lenders’ side by 
thinking about the conditional distribution of 
L π  before and after α  is revealed.  Without 
this information, the lender will issue loans to any applicant for whom  0 (,,) 0
LL Z ππ =∅ ∅ > , 
and so offers contracts to the right half of the distribution of expected profits.  Once α is 
observable, there will be a new distribution of expected profits, and there may be fixed costs 
of adjusting contracts to this new equilibrium.  Let  0 (, 0 )
LL φα π≥  represent the pdf of 
expected profits using the information in the bureau among borrowers who wanted loans and 
who were offered loans without the bureau, and  0 (, 0 )
LL φα π<  represent the pdf among 
those who wanted loans but were not offered loans without the bureau.  
Figure 1 illustrates the borrowers who are picked up and dropped.  The discontinuous 
decision to acquire or eject clients will be determined by the points at which the fixed costs of 
taking either move exceed the revenue from doing so, resulting in selection out of a density   
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0 (, 0 )
FC
LLd φα π α
−
−∞
≥ ∫  of ‘bad’ borrowers and selection in of a density  0 (, 0 )
LL
FC
d φα π α
+
∞
< ∫  of 
‘good’ ones.  If it more costly to acquire new clients than to eject old ones, the lender’s 
extensive margin will be more sensitive to negative information than positive.  The use of a 
bureau may decrease the fixed cost of acquiring new clients, thereby increasing the overall 
density that receives loans 
The interesting cases of lender switching from the demand side can be modelled 
using a two-lender world.  We formalize the difference between α  and 
B α  through the 
observation that a well-informed borrower will be able to infer α from a.  Specifically, when 
lenders start using a bureau the borrowers know that each lender can now observe the 
experience X that the other lender has accumulated with a given borrower.  Thus if a borrower 
has taken loans only from Lender 1, they know that lender will simply see  1 X  when they look 
in the bureau, and so the new information revealed is  1 α = ∅.  If Lender 2 looks in the bureau 
in the same situation, however, he will see  21 X α = . This means that for a borrower who 
takes loans from both lenders and who knows that both lenders use the bureau will have 
{ } 21 ,
B X X α = , and will have 
B α = ∅if neither lender uses the bureau.  The corresponding 
contracts observed for a given borrower (holding X and Z  constant) can be written 
{ } 1221 () ,() f Xf X and { } 12 () ,() ff ∅∅  in the case with and without the bureau, respectively..   
  From here we can characterize the possible borrower responses to knowing that 
lender information has changed.  If a borrower takes no loans with or without the bureau, or 
takes a loan only from a single lender with and without the bureau, we do not need a two-
lender modeol.    In the more interesting cases, the bureau induces the relative profitability of 
loans from the two lenders to change in some way.   
W assign Lender 1 as the ‘inside’ lender, from whom the borrower has already been 
taking loans. 
•  If borrower profit is maximized under the contracts { } 21 0, ( ) f X , when the bureau is 
used Lender 2 offers contract that gives the borrower higher profits than the pre-  
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bureau contract { } 1() , 0 f ∅ .  This implies that the borrower must lie in Region A for 
Lender 2 in Figure 1, and this borrower will ‘graduate’ to the second lender.
7 
•  If a borrower is credit-constrained under the offer from the inside lender without the 
bureau, then profit will be maximized under the contract { } 1221 () ,() f Xf X, and so a 
borrower in Region A moves to using multiple lenders when the bureau is in use. 
•  If  (, ) 0
L ZX π > , both lenders are willing to make an offer to a borrower in the 
absence of the bureau, but if  (, , ) 0
L
i ZXX π − <  for either lender (meaning that the 
borrower is in Region B), then we have the situation described in McIntosh & 
Wydick (2005), where the bureau is used to restrict ‘double-dipping’.   
 
4.3.  THE SELECTION PROCESS 
An empirical analysis should take account of this two-sided selection process, and 
also account for estimation error.  The system of equations is thus: 
  () ,,
B BB B Za ππ α ε =+  (1) 
  () ,,
LB B L Z ππ α α ε =+  (2) 
  () ,, , ,
B f fZXa u αα =+  (3) 
where f is only observed for clients that have applied and been selected, i.e., agents for which 
0
B π ≥  and  0
L π ≥ . In this formulation, the distributions of 
B ε , 
L ε , and u are defined over 
the whole population. 
  If we could observe the population from which the applicants emerge and the 
selection process, we would estimate (1) identifying the applicant from the population, then 
(2) identifying the selected from the applicants, and then (3) for the observed clients.   
Because of the selection process, the conditional mean of the error term: 
  () 0, 0 0
BL Euππ ≥≥ ≠  
                                            
7 A canonical case of lender heterogeneity (from Navajas et al 2003) is that one lender has high fixed costs and 
low variable costs, giving a comparative advantage in large loans.  In this case the greater mobility induced by 
the bureau allows lenders to pair with the lender specialized in providing loans of the right size, rather than 
becoming an informational hostage to the lender with whom they first established a relationship.   
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The correction terms depend on the distribution of the error terms.  Assuming for example a 
trivariate normal distribution, the expression will depend on whether the two error terms 
B ε  
and 
L ε  are correlated or not.  If they are not correlated, i.e.,  () cov , 0





() () ()() 0, 0 , , , ,
BL
B L BB
BL B BL L BL Eu Za Z
φπ φπ
ππ γ γ γ λ α γ λ α α
ππ
⋅⋅
≥≥ = − − = − −
Φ⋅ Φ⋅
 (4) 
In the more likely case of correlated error terms,  () cov ,
BL εε σ = , one would consider using a 
bivariate probit method for estimating (1) and (2), wherein: 
  () 0, 0
BL
ij B BL L LB E uM M ππ γ γ ≥≥ = + , (5) 
with: 
  () ()
1 2 1 BLB L M GG σσ
−

















4.4.  CONDITIONAL MEAN OUTCOMES AMONG BORROWERS 
Given the selection process, the conditional mean on a credit market outcome f(.) among the 
clients is thus: 
  () ( ) () () ,, , , , , , , , ,
B BB
BB L LL B Ef fZXa M Z a M Z a αα γ αα γ αα =+ + . (6) 
  It might appear that the best way to separate the demand- and supply-side effects of 
credit market information would be to use data on all borrower application decisions and all 
lender selection decisions.  Equation (6) tells us, however, that in the full-information world 
where α and 
B α  change together, this information is insufficient.  Lenders can only choose 
borrowers from among the pool that applies, and borrowers will alter application decisions 
based on the degree to which the bureau reveals positive or negative information about them.  
Because we lack an exclusion restriction on the separate effects of these two kinds of 
information, non-experimental identification will be confounded. 































 gives the auto-selection effect of borrowers learning that the lender is 
using a CB. 
  The value of the unusual way in which the Guatemalan bureau was rolled out, 
combined with very detailed panel data on borrower behavior, is that we have the ability to 
identify each of these four terms separately.  The staggered rollout of the bureau altered α, 
while changing 
B α  only minimally.  Thus changes in outcomes among new borrowers who 















.  Correspondingly, the 
randomized training program changed 
B α  in an environment where the use of the bureau 
and hence α  was constant.  So we can examine changes in group composition induced by 
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4.5.  DIFFERENTIAL IMPACTS 
  The observed impact of the revelation of new behavior α from the bureau (and the 
resultant borrower inference 
B α ) is likely to be modulated by two factors in a systematic way.  
The first is through the influence of X, borrower information that was unobservable at the 
time of initial screening but which becomes observable as the lender’s experience with a given 
client increases.  Because the lender is naturally engaged in using its full information set 
(, ) Z X  to predict the relevant unobservable information a, the richer the information set in 
X becomes, the less residual unknown information remains.  Thus for a client with a rich 
information set X we would expect to see a smaller lender response to observation of a given 
piece of information in the bureau than for a new borrower for whom  X =∅.     
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  The second systematic source of variation will arise from the fact that Crediref 
reports information on group repayment behavior, rather than individual repayment.  So a 
bureau record gives the repayment for a group loan and the size of the group that took that 
loan, but for groups greater than 1 there is no way to infer whether this specific individual has 
had a repayment problem, or indeed what is the total level of indebtedness of the individual.
8  
For those who take solely individual loans, this oddity vanishes.  For borrowers further down 
the ladder of credit, where all loans are taken in large groups, the bureau provides an 
exceedingly vague picture of borrower quality.  One indication of this difference in quality is 
that Genesis is willing to pay the fixed costs of a check in the bureau (about $1) for over 60% 
of the recurring individual and solidarity group loans, but for less than 2% of recurring 
communal bank loans.  Consequently, we find no impact of the lender starting to use the 
bureau on communal bank clients, and there should be a correspondingly insignificant 
decrease in the reduction in moral hazard for communal bank borrowers when they learn of 
the use of the bureau.     
   
V.   THE LENDER BEGINS USING THE BUREAU. 
The staggered entry of Genesis’ branches into the credit bureau provides us with a 
natural experiment in alteration of lender information.  Luoto et al (2007) perform tests of the 
impacts of this staggered entry using aggregated data, and provide evidence for the fact that 
the rollout was a valid natural experiment and that borrowers did indeed know very little as to 
the workings of the bureau.  Using loan-level data, we can measure several interesting effects 
that are not visible using branch-level data.  Firstly, because we can observe whether each 
loan is issued to a new or to an ongoing borrower, we are able to disentangle the screening 
effects of the bureau on the extensive margin from changes in contracts on the intensive 
margin.   Secondly, we can track the differences over time between borrowers who entered 
Genesis before and after the bureau was being used, and so measure the longer-term effects 
of improved information.  Finally, because we also observe the credit officer who issues each 
                                            
8 While this system appears anomalous, there are good reasons to think that this will be a standard feature of 
credit reporting systems in microfinance markets.  The first is that the data management software of many 
smaller lenders never tracks loans at the individual level, and so they may be unable to prepare reports on group 
loans for each member of the group.  Secondly, in some Latin American countries (such as Peru) have taken the 
approach that, since a loan is technically made to a group, there should be no legal recourse available to lenders 
against delinquent individuals as long as the groups to which they belong successfully repaid the loan.   
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loan, we can examine changes of behavior at the level of the individual who actually makes 
loan screening decisions. 
The results of the first exercise are given in Tables 1 and 2.  Table 1 measures changes 









, by measuring changes in the lending 
contracts observed on first loans which were issued before and after the bureau.  The 
regressions use branch and month fixed effects, and robust standard errors clustered at the 
branch level.  For loans given to individual clients, where we would expect the effects of new 
information to be strongest, we see a sharp decrease in the share of loans that were charged 
late fees, and this is accomplished despite the fact that the average loan size to individuals 
increased weakly.  Loans more than 2 months delinquent, which would be technically under 
default, are not changed.  For group borrowers, on the other hand, we see that the 
improvement in repayment performance is weaker (now insignificant), and that there has 
been a decrease in loan sizes of almost 20%.  Hence the pure adverse selection effect of the 
bureau is to improve interim repayment performance strongly among individual borrowers 
while not decreasing loan sizes, while group performance is improved less strongly and only 
through a large decrease in loan sizes to new borrowers.   
Table 1b places these relatively modest changes in new client behavior in context by 
demonstrating the enormous changes in selection in and selection out induced by the use of 
the bureau.  For individual loans, we see that the bureau induces a symmetric change in the 
percentage of all borrowers who are kicked out and who leave; both figures increase by 
roughly 17 percentage points.  In other words, there is a period of great upheaval in the client 
base triggered by the use of the bureau.  Figure 2 shows the large increase in new individual 
clients that occurs for roughly six months after the bureau is implemented. For solidarity 
groups, the picture is somewhat more nuanced; individuals within these groups are much 
more likely to be expelled, but the groups themselves become more durable as a result of the 
bureau.  The net effect of a large decrease in enrolment of new members into old groups and 
a large increase in expulsions from old groups is the dramatic decrease in group size 
illustrated in Figure 3.   There is, however, a corresponding explosion in the number of 
completely new solidarity groups that are formed, indicating that the bureau causes the lender 
to change from growing the group loan client base through forcing existing groups to   
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approve new members to simply creating new groups.  In other words, they rely less on joint 
liability as a screening tool when they have recourse to the bureau. 
Table 2 carries out the reverse exercise; we include only borrowers who took loans 
both before and after the bureau was being used in their respective branch.  Because we 
include borrower-level fixed effects, the treatment effect now measures changes in contracts 
for ongoing clients.  Since we have limited the sample to those for whom  (,) 0
B Za π ≥ , 
() 0
L Z π ≥ , and  (,) 0
L Z πα ≥ , we follow a consistent cohort through the implementation of 






.  For the solidarity group borrowers, we see a small increase in loan 
sizes with no corresponding worsening of repayment performance.  For individual 
borrowers, on the other hand, we see the only indication of a negative impact of the bureau 
(from the lender’s perspective):   loan volumes increase but so does default.  There are two 
ways of thinking about this otherwise surprising result.  The first would take into account the 
enormous increase in the screening of new clients that is transpiring as the bureau is being 
introduced, and argue that through some multi-tasking problem, the credit officers have 
neglected the ongoing clients and hence allowed repayment to deteriorate.  A more likely 
explanation, however, is provided by the extremely low mean default rate among these 
ongoing clients; 2% versus an institutional average of over 4%.  If we think of default as 
following a Markov process, whereby any borrower with a negative realization in the previous 
period is screened out, then it is natural to suspect that this result arises from mean reversion.  
Nonetheless, the conclusion is that the tremendous improvement in information on new 
clients is not matched by a corresponding improvement in information for existing clients, 
implying that the information in X may allow lenders to do a reasonable job of proxying for 
the information revealed through α .    
Having, in Table 1, calculated the impact of the information in the bureau on first 
loans, we wish to understand how the subsequent performance of clients differs depending 
on whether they were initially selected before or after the bureau.  Table 3 shows the results of 
this analysis.  Individual borrowers selected with the bureau are half again as likely as those 
selected before the bureau to go on to take subsequent loans: the mean probability is .44 and 
the increase in this probability for those selected with the bureau is .23, with a t-statistic of   
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almost nine.  These subsequent loans are taken somewhat sooner, and the size of these loans 
is roughly 12% larger.  Therefore we see strong evidence that the improvement in 
performance of individual borrowers extends well beyond the first loan.  Group borrowers, 
on the other hand, show no differences in taking subsequent loans depending on whether 
they were selected with or without the bureau.  This is consistent with the joint liability 
mechanism providing a richer information set when group borrowers are screened. 
One way of summarizing the joint effects of lender information on the intensive and 
extensive margin is to use the credit officer as the unit of analysis.  In this way we can 
measure efficiency effects of the bureau as well, by examining whether a given employee is 
able to increase the number of new borrowers whose applications they process in a given 
period of time (here, in a month).  Table 4 uses lender and month fixed effects and examines 
the impact of the bureau on a variety of outcomes.  There is very large increase in the number 
of new borrowers (double) and new loans (4 on a basis of 5.8).  This increase arises from 
increases in individual clients and group clients in similar proportions.  The average size of 
the first loan issued by Genesis doubles when they begin using the bureau, but the number and 
volume of loans to old clients were not affected in any significant way.  The total effect 
among all clients is thus an increase in the number of new loans by 1.9 on a basis of 7.12 and 
an increase in the portfolio growth of 20%, although not precisely measured.  The growth of 
loans to both individuals and groups in the whole institution increased sharply as a result of 
the use of the bureau. 
Using the data from the bureau, we ran a number of regressions (not shown) to test 
for whether improvements in Genesis’ information caused changes in Genesis’ clients’ 
behavior with other lenders.  Given that borrowers knew little about this change, we do not 
expect to see shifts induced by borrowers seeking out new opportunities (for this, see the 
next section).  However, it is possible that changes in the contracts offered by Genesis would 
have altered demand with other lenders.  The data structure for this analysis is not ideal, 
because Guatemalan law stipulates that the bureau can only keep a two-year window of data 
on borrower behavior.  For this reason we could only observe outside borrowing behavior 
for the latter third of the branches of Genesis entering the bureau, but in no case did we find 
any significant impacts.     
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Our results suggest that improvements in information on the supply side of the 
market lead to major adjustments on the extensive margin, with virtually no intensive effect 
for ongoing borrowers.  In other words, the lender learns very useful information about 
individuals borrowers to whom they have not given loans before, and they learn useful 
negative information about ongoing borrowers.  However, given that they decide to continue 
to lend to a borrower once they have looked in the bureau, there is little improvement in their 
ability to increase loan sizes without seeing a corresponding decrease in repayment 
performance.  For solidarity group borrowers, the bureau induces a strong swing toward 
smaller groups and new clients, and also appears to allow lenders to increase loan sizes 
without causing problems.  There is a huge increase in employee efficiency at the lender, with 
the average credit officer moving from screening six new borrowers to ten new borrowers 
per month. 
 
VI.   BORROWERS LEARN THAT THE LENDER IS USING THE BUREAU. 
The population used in this analysis consists of all the credit groups from seven 
branches selected from the 39 branches of Genesis to represent the variety of Genesis 
clients.
9  Within each of these seven branches, we randomly selected a predetermined number 
of groups for treatment, the others forming the control groups. Table 5 gives the 
treatment/control structure, and presents relevant statistics at the branch level for the 
selected branches. 
Once selected, groups were notified that they were eligible to receive a free 
information session, and they were requested by their credit officer to appear at a specific 
time and place in order to receive the information.  Attendance was entirely voluntary, and if 
a group did not show up the first time, two subsequent efforts were made to call it for the 
session. The percentage of chosen units that were in fact treated varies from 31% to 100% 
across branches, with an average response rate of 62%.   The lowest saturation came from the 
branch of El Castaño in Guatemala City, a neighborhood branch which saw problems during 
                                            
9 This selection was done by randomly selecting one branch in each of seven groups of similar branches 
constituted by credit officers with intimate knowledge of the institution. However, despite the randomization, 
the average characteristics of the groups from these selected branches do not perfectly match those of the non-
selected branches.  We therefore limit the analysis to the groups from the selected branches.   
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the course of the study.   Excluding El Castaño and its corresponding control, we are left 
with a remaining overall response rate of 69%.   
The information sessions took place over a period of four months, from July to 
November 2004, with the order in which groups were called randomly defined.  The timing 
of the treatment is thus specific to each treated group and we assign the median of the 
treatment dates within each branch to the control groups.   
The quality of the randomization can be gauged from Table 6.  Comparing the mean 
values of group-average characteristics such as age, marital status, education, gender, and 
ethnicity, we find no evidence of significant differences between the selected and control 
groups.  Looking at Table 7 on repayment performance of the 1549 loans taken between 
January 2003 and June 2004, the situation is, however, less ideal. The selected groups perform 
better than the control groups, and the groups actually treated even more so.  Hence, the de 
facto selection of groups in the field does appear to have favored good groups that were 
experiencing less repayment problems.  The selection effect present in the decision to attend 
the information sessions is strongly positive: groups that had lower default to begin with were 
the ones that chose to attend.   
An additional view of the selection effects present among non-compliers comes from 
comparing the evolution of the repayment performance of non-compliers to that of control 
groups.  This is done by estimating a difference-in-differences regression on loan repayment 
performance, similar to the impact regressions run elsewhere in the paper, comparing the 
non-compliers to the controls:   
  lgt g t lgt lgt yT u α αδ =+ + +       (8) 
 
where  lgt y  is an indicator of repayment performance on loan l from group g, with its last 
payment made at time t,  g α  and  t α  are group and time fixed effects, and  lgt u  the 
unobserved component.  The "treatment" variable  lgt T  is set equal to 1 if g is a non-complier 
group and  g t τ ≥ , the treatment date.
10 Column 3 in Table 8 reports the estimated parameters 
δ  for the two measures of repayment performance.  These results indicate no significant 
                                            
10 As explained above, since none of these groups was treated, the treatment date is set to the median date of all 
information sessions in the branch.   
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selection effects, suggesting that while the non-compliers had in average worse repayment 
performance than the control groups, they exhibit no significant intention to treat effect.    
Because of this relatively high non-response rate and apparent selection in 
compliance, our analysis focuses on an intention to treat effect (ITE) rather than the 
treatment effect on the treated (TET).  It gives a downward estimation of the impact of 
acquiring the information on the functioning of a credit bureau. To the extent that a non-
experimental program would have a similar compliance rate, the ITE is also the quantity of 
interest for an institution considering a similar information program.   
In addition, we conduct the impact analyses in the remainder of the paper using 
differencing techniques to remove any fixed differences between units.  Before we present 
these results, we verify, using false DID tests, that no spurious treatment effects are present 
in the selected groups.  The false treatment effects regressions are estimated by dividing the 
pre-treatment time period into two equal halves, and checking for differences between 
selected for treatment and control groups between these two periods using group fixed 
effects and month dummies: 
 
  lgt g t lgt lgt yF T u α αδ =+ + +       (9) 
 
The observations include all loans completed between January 16, 2003 and May 16, 2004.  
and the "false treatment" is set to take place in the middle of the pre-treatment period, such 
that  1 lgt FT =  if the group g has been selected for treatment, and t ≥ September 16, 2003.  
None of the false intention to treat effects featured in the first two columns of Table 8 are 
significant, indicating that there are no serious biases in using double differences.   
 
6.1. EVIDENCE ON MORAL HAZARD, SELECTION IN GROUPS, AND OUTSIDE BORROWING 
The instantaneous impact of the information program on inside repayment isolates 
the moral hazard effect that arises from the desire to use reputation from a given 
microfinance agency to leverage credit from other sources.  Since group composition takes 
time to change, there should be only the moral hazard effect present in the discontinuity, and 
hence in the short run our experiment represents an instrument for the value that clients 
place on outside credit.  Over time, the repercussions of changes in group membership   
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undertaken due to the bureau begin to have their own effects upon inside repayment, adding 
adverse selection to moral hazard effects.  
An important aspect of the treatment was to inform the Genesis clients of the 
potential use of their good track record in past borrowing to access outside loans from other 
lenders.  Many MFIs are, in fact, reluctant to join a credit bureau precisely for this reason that 
they may lose their best clients to competitive lenders.  At the same time, the credit bureau 
reveals to the institution the total of outstanding debt of the client, reducing the potential 
usage of double dipping to obtain a level of credit beyond repayment capacity. We, therefore, 
expect the effect of information to induce an increase in outside borrowing from clients that 
are most constrained by what Genesis can offer them.  Whether the clients can properly 
judge their own ability to sustain higher indebtedness is, however, not sure.  For the lender 
that looks at the information contained in the credit bureau, a clean slate during a short two-
year period is also not a guarantee that the borrower is a solid client.  Hence, while a good 
record in the credit bureau can be used for getting access to outside credit, it does not 
guarantee success in this endeavor. 
In practice the analysis is complicated by the fact that the information sessions will 
only have an impact insofar as they impart previously unknown information.  As a general 
matter, knowledge of the workings or indeed the existence of Crediref was very low among 
clients; not one of 184 clients surveyed in 2003 was aware that information was being shared 
between MFIs.  That said, certainly some clients would have possessed better information, or 
at least more realistic expectations, over the process of information sharing.  Such clients will 
appear to have a lower impact (and hence a smaller moral hazard response) simply because 
they learned less from the sessions.  A causal impact of the treatment, then, is composite of 
the amount that was learned and how what was learned effects behavior. 
 
6.2.  THE INTENSIVE MARGIN:  DISCONTINUOUS IMPACT WITHIN A LOAN CYCLE. 
In isolating the moral hazard effect, we are aided by the fact that a group loan is made 
to a fixed group of people, and so within a single loan cycle there is no turnover.  Thus, an 
analysis performed within the loan cycle where information sessions occurred contains only 
the effects of the treatment on the behavior of a given set of individuals.  The analysis is done 
separately for solidarity groups and communal banks. The observations are the different   
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intermediate payments made on the loans that were active at the time of the treatment.  
Because repayment problems tend to come only after a certain time is elapsed, we control for 
where in the loan cycle the repayment takes place.  A complication occurs in that loans are of 
different length and require various numbers of intermediate repayments.  To make these 
repayments comparable, we therefore divide the length of each loan cycle in 10 equal 
intervals of time, that we refer to as deciles, and we control for the deciles rather than the 




plt l t d plt plt plt yD T u ααβ δ =++ + +       (10) 
 
where  plt y  is an indicator of performance for payment p made at time t on loan l that was 
active at time of treatment. The deciles dummy variable 
d
plt D  is equal to 1 if the payment 
belongs to decile d.  The treatment variable, defined at the payment level,  plt T  is set equal to 1 
if the payment p is in loan l taken by a group g that was selected for treatment and  g t τ > , the 
treatment date for group g.   
We see in the results reported in column 1 of Table 9 that there was no significant 
change in performance on intermediate payments for the loan in progress in both SG and 
CB.   
However, there were significant improvements in the final repayment performance, 
but only for SG.  There was a decline in the percentage of delinquent payments of 18% in the 
treatments relative to the controls, and while the fall in the amount of late fees assessed is not 
significant, it is large in percentage terms.  This indicates that SG, with a smaller number of 
members over which collective control can be exercised, are in a better position than larger 
CB in controlling moral hazard behavior among members. Thus the immediate message 




                                            
11  Although Crediref does in fact report on these intermediate payments, we encountered widespread confusion 
among credit officers as to how to interpret this data, and so the clients were probably correct in presuming that 
it was the final repayment status of the loan that mattered most.   
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6.3. IMPACT ACROSS LOAN CYCLES. 
We have data on repayment behavior from Genesis for one year after the 
intervention.  Over this intermediate time frame, we expect the moral hazard impacts to 
dominate although, in groups that take one or more loans after having received the 
information, repayment behavior is also plausibly being effected by the selection response of 
group members.  These impacts are measured by estimating the repayment performance at 
the loan level over the long period 2002-2005.  We used both OLS difference-in-difference 
and group fixed effects estimators:   
 
  lgt t g lgt lgt yS T u α αδ =+ + +        ( 1 1 )  
or 
  lgt t g lgt lgt yT u α αδ =++ +        ( 1 2 )  
 
where  lgt y  is a measure of repayment performance of loan l of group g with last payment at 
time t,  g S  a dummy variable indicating that the group g was selected for treatment, and  lgt T  
the treatment variable equal to 1 if the group g was selected for treatment and  g t τ > , the 
treatment date for group g.  We also do two TET estimations in which non-compliers are 
omitted.  
Results are reported in Table 10.  The strongest evidence of impact is seen in the 
probability of having a delinquent loan, with an ITE of 4 to 10 and a TET of 5 to 11 
percentage points.  OLS estimates are strongly significant, and fixed effects somewhat less so.  
The other indicator shows improvement as well, although the t-statistics are low.   
Throughout, the ITE is almost exactly the TET times the share of selected clients that 
actually complied, which is consistent with no residual selection effects and no spillover 
effects. Separating SG and CB, we see that moral hazard and adverse selection improvements 
were exclusively confined to SG, with no change in the repayment performance of CB.  
 
6.4. THE EXTENSIVE MARGIN:  IMPACT ON GROUP COMPOSITION. 
Analysis of the adverse selection effect of the treatment is most easily accomplished 
by looking directly at the characteristics of the individuals who are leaving and joining groups 
subsequent to the information sessions.  While it would be possible to look at the change of   
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the average characteristics of groups over time, the severe autocorrelation that would 
inevitably be present in such averaged measures makes this an unattractive approach.  The 
characteristics of the specific individuals who come and go from groups, on the other hand, 
provide a discrete and clear-cut response to the information sessions.  
In response to the understanding of the use of Crediref, new clients are undoubtedly 
selected for their desirable features associated to good repayment.  Dropouts, however, may 
either exit the group freely, in which case selection is on desirable features associated with 
good repayment, or they may be expelled by the group, in which case selection is on the 
undesirable features associated with bad repayment. 
To establish which individual characteristics are associated with good repayment 
behavior by a group, we estimated the correlations between having a delinquent last payment 
and ever making a late payment with client characteristics, from a simple cross-sectional 
regression on the pre-treatment period: 
 
  lgt t lg lgt yX u αβ =+ +         (13) 
 
where  lg X  is a vector of average characteristics of the member of group g participating to 
loan l.  Results reported in Table 11 show that bad repayment behavior is associated with 
being divorced, female, younger, and having not banked previously with  any of the Crediref 
member institutions. 
We now examine these average characteristics among those leaving (dropouts) and 
those entering (new clients) groups in each borrowing cycle before and after the treatment.  
New members are defined as members that join a group after the first loan of the group, and 
dropout members those that quit the group before the last loan.  Members that do not 
participate to a particular loan cycle, but return to the group for a subsequent loan are not 
counted as dropout and new at their temporary exit.  We used both OLS difference-in-
difference and branch fixed effects estimators:   
 








where  lgt z is the characteristic of interest (number of new / dropout members, average 
demographic characteristic of the new /dropout members ) for the loan l taken by group g at 
time t,  g SG  is an indicator variable for Solidarity Groups,  g S  a dummy variable indicating 
that the group g was selected for treatment, and 
SG
b α  and 
CB
b α  are branch fixed effects for 
SG and CB respectively.   
Similar patterns emerge from estimation of the post-treatment change in 
characteristics by the two methods (Table 12). The strongest effect is a very sharp decrease in 
the percentage of women in groups, resulting from an exodus of women accompanied by a 
decrease in entry of new women to groups selected for receiving the information on Crediref.  
Seen from the perspective of free exit, this would imply that women were the better clients 
and were choosing to leave sub-par groups after the treatment.  However, given the 
correlations measured in Table 11, a more likely story is that female repayment problems are 
more common and so the increase in male membership is a function of increasing group 
selection and discipline.   
 
6.5. BEHAVIOR WITH OTHER CREDIREF LENDERS. 
Information on Genesis clients became available to outside lenders in 2002, and 
hence their credit records have been used to determine their access to loans with other 
lenders.  However, to the extent that clients were not aware of this possibility before the 
information sessions, they did not explicitly use their reputation to search for other loans.   
To measure the effect of this awareness, we analyze a number of indicators of external 
borrowing seen in the Crediref records. 
Crediref collects information once a month on each of the loans taken by an 
individual.  For group loans, the recorded information is on the total loan to the members of 
the group, not on the individual share in the group loan, meaning that the recorded level of 
indebtedness is the total amount taken out by the group, and the recorded repayment 
performance is also the performance of the group.  We characterize a client’s outside (non-
Genesis) borrowing by the number of loans taken.  We will characterize the repayment 
performance of each completed loan by whether there has been any late payment during its   
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cycle. These SG and CB clients of Genesis do not have enough individual loans to make a 
separate analysis of individual and group loans. In this analysis, we only consider Genesis 
clients that were members of a group at time of treatment, and their treatment status is that 
of the group to which they belonged.
12  
The date recorded for each loan in Crediref is the date of the last data entry, which 
corresponds to the closing date of the loan (except for the current loans which have their last 
transaction recorded in June 2005). In this analysis we consider as pre-treatment all loans 
completed before the treatment date.   Using a DID method, we estimate the following 
equation:  
 
  ig g ig Su α δ ∆=+ +  
 
where  ig ∆  characterizes the change in outside loans reported in Crediref from the pre-
treatment to the post-treatment period of individual i from group g, α  represents the average 
change in outside borrowing for the members of the control groups, and  g S  a dummy 
variable indicating that the group g was selected for treatment. The parameter δ  measures 
the ITE effect of the information sessions. We use change in number of loans and whether 
individual i started taking outside loans after the treatment date.  
Results are reported in Table 13.  The interpretation of the observed changes is 
confounded by the fact that Crediref was rapidly expanding during this period.  As more and 
more MFIs and Banks were joining the credit bureau, the information thickened and the 
number of reported loans increased without implying an actual increase in borrowing.  The 
changes observed for the control clients can, however, serve as a reference for interpreting 
the magnitude of the DID measure of impact.  Considering all 5419 clients together, there is 
no significant effect on the number of loans taken, but there is a 29% (calculated as 
107/363*100) increase in the number of members that are reported taking an outside loan for 
the first time. For the SG members, there is a striking absence of effect of the sessions on 
                                            
12 When clients belonged to two groups, they were considered treated if at least one of their groups was treated.  
About 3% of the control SG clients (20% of the control CB) changed group, joining a treated group after the 
treatment date.  We also perform the analysis by attributing them the status of treated starting from the date 
they joined the treated group.  Results are very similar and not reported here.    
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their taking outside loans.  We searched for heterogeneity among these SG members, along 
their relationship with Genesis (contrasting old and new clients, with many or few loans) and 
their past performance in Genesis and with their recorded outside loans, and found no group 
that increased its engagement outside of Genesis.   
By contrast CB members increased the number of outside loans by 47% and 
increased by 31% the number of new entrants in outside borrowing.  This difference may be 
due to SG members being already more engaged in outside borrowing (18% of the SG 
members had records of outside borrowing prior to the treatment, while only 12% of the CB 
members had any), meaning that they were less constrained and thus less eager to take on the 
opportunity or more informed of the existence of Crediref, implying that the information 
sessions had less impact on them.   
Who among the CB members responded to the information by engaging into outside 
borrowing?  The bottom rows of Table 13 report the contrast in ITE for good Genesis 
clients (never had a delinquent repayment) and bad clients (had at least a delinquent 
repayment) as well as for more experienced clients (had 4 or more loans with Genesis) and 
less experienced clients (had 3 or less loans with Genesis).  Good CB clients respond to 
information about their public reputation by increasing the number of loans taken outside 
(+13%) and the number of them taking outside loans increases by 11%.  By contrast, bad 
clients, with knowledge that their defaults in repayment is public information, are not able to 
increase their outside borrowing.  The impact of information in inducing outside borrowing 
is stronger on the less experienced clients (who increase the number of loans by 12% while 
16% start taking outside loans) than it is on their more experienced counterparts who do not 
change their outside borrowing.  We will see later that increased borrowing by these less 
experienced clients can have a perverse effect on their repayment performance.  
Table 14 reports the impact of the information sessions on the change in 
performance on outside loans: 
 
  libt b t lit lit yT u α αδ =++ + 
 
where  libt y  is a measure of performance for the loan l taken by individual i from branch b last 
recorded in Crediref at time t.  The treatment variable  lit T  is equal to 1 if individual i was   
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member of a group selected at time of treatment and  i t τ ≥ , the treatment date.  We also 
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The performance is measured by a binary variable indicating whether there was any 
late repayment during the loan cycle.  Note first that there has been an important decline in 
repayment problems even for members of the control groups, from its occurrence in 17% of 
the reported loans to 6% on average in the post-treatment period.  The absence of overall 
impact of information on performance hides an interesting heterogeneity by type of 
borrower, notably among CB members.  We saw that it is the less experienced Genesis clients 
who started to aggressively take outside loans.  Yet, it is precisely them who worsened their 
repayment performance. To the contrary, the more experienced Genesis clients did not 
increase their loan taking in spite of an acquired public reputation, and they improved their 
repayment performance as defaults undermining reputation are now more costly. This 
indicates that the opportunity revealed by the information for clients to use their good 
reputation to access outside loans may end up with a deterioration of credit record when 
taken by less experienced borrowers.   
 
VII.  CONCLUSION. 
We analyze the impact of the introduction of a credit bureau on borrower behavior, a 
transition from private reputation to public reputation in the microfinance industry..  This 
institutional change is symptomatic of an effort by the microfinance industry to broaden an 
“honesty equilibrium” in the face of rising competition. We combined for this a natural 
experiment in Guatemala consisting in the staggered entry of a large microfinance lender into 
a credit bureau (with use of bureau information in the first stage only for selection, without 
informing borrowers), with a randomized experiment to provide information to groups of 
borrowers about the existence of the credit bureau and its implications for them, and with 
access to administrative data on client records from both the microfinance lender and the 
credit bureau.  The randomized experiment allows to measure how knowledge of the rules of 
operation of the credit bureau affects the behavior of members of credit groups both with 
the initial microfinance lender and with other lenders. By analyzing the behavioral response   
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across successive loan cycles, we are able to evidence the roles of information on the supply 
and demand side separately. We also analyze the impact of public reputation on access to 
loans from other lenders and on borrowers’ repayment performance on these loans. 
The use of the bureau by the lender results in a strong reduction in adverse selection, 
and a correspondingly large improvement in performance indicators at the borrower and 
credit officer level.  When group loan borrowers learn about the rules of operation of a credit 
bureau, the repayment performance of (small) SGs improves, but that of (large) CBs does 
not.  This improvement in SGs is due to both the curbing of moral hazard behavior (as 
isolated in the current loan cycle) and to improved group selection.  Improved group 
selection is done by shedding the weaker members, in particular women with average inferior 
repayment performance.  In Hirschman’s (1970) terminology, selection is due to “voice and 
loyalty” with groups expelling bad performers, as opposed to “exit” whereby good 
performers leave poorly performing groups, seeking better options.   
Additional sources of heterogeneity in impacts are the length of experience that a 
borrower has with Genesis before they learn of the use of the bureau, and their quality as a 
borrower during that time.  SG members with good repayment performance before 
treatment leave Genesis and take larger group loans.  This gives evidence of some graduation 
toward outside borrowing, indicating that the credit bureau indeed opens new options to the 
better performing SG borrowers.  Results are quite the opposite for members of CBs.  There, 
members with good performance records took more outside loans.  This is done by clients 
with good Genesis performance that they can now value externally as they know that it is 
public. Impact on performance was, however, sharply contrasted among more and less 
experienced borrowers.  Clients with a long experience in borrowing from Genesis do not 
take more loans, but improve their repayment performance.  By contrast, clients with limited 
experience are drawn into taking more outside loans and tend to fail to perform on these 
loans, worsening their repayment records.  Hence, information about public reputation can 
be a two-edged sword, putting at risk of unrestrained borrowing exuberance those with 
limited experience in taking loans. 
New information over the workings of a credit bureau has a powerful effect on 
borrower behavior.  The outside lenders extended this new credit knowing the reputation on 
pre-existing indebtedness and performance of the borrowers’ groups.  The fact that we find   
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strong differences across characteristics observable in the bureau on these outside loans 
implies that the use of a credit scoring model could improve lender efficiency in making 
multiple loans.  The borrowers who were taking loans most similar to those offered at much 
lower rates by the top-tier lenders in Crediref (SG) did not rush out to take new loans; rather 
they engaged in a systematic improvement of their records in both inside and outside lenders.  
By reporting on group loan behavior, the bureau suffers from some informational efficiency 
loss, but actually bolsters the collective incentives that have led to the extension of 
uncollateralized credit to the poor on a joint liability basis.  In short, ensuring that the 
individuals covered by a bureau are well-informed as to its working is a straightforward way 
for MFI lenders of increasing loan efficiency among top-tier group borrowers (SG) and to 
induce all bad borrowers to improve their performance. It also allows to deepen pro-poor 
capital markets for good borrowers (CB) and to strengthen the rungs on the credit ladder 
(SG). However, and not unexpectedly with an efficiency-enhancing institutional innovation, it 
leads to the shedding of weaker group members by enhanced incentives for groups to reduce 
AS, and to mistaken increase in indebtedness by less experienced severely constrained 
members (CB).   
We demonstrate that bureaus are effective in improving outcomes in a credit market.  
Since they are a relatively low-cost intervention, this implies that they should be made a part 
of efforts to achieve financial deepening in developing countries.  Their use appears to be 
almost universally to the benefit of lenders, and in a competitive market, this should lead to 
lower interest rates for borrowers over time.  The losers from the introduction of a bureau 
are those borrowers who are screened out a result of the information, and ongoing borrowers 
who may lose insurance opportunities as a result of the winnowing of the borrower pool.  We 
show that group reporting can in fact reinforce the group mechanisms that underlie 
microfinance lending.  The ultimate outcome is efficiency gains for the innovating 
institutions, gains for the more capable economic agents, and increased social differentiation. 
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Table 1a.  Extensive margin of staggered rollout:  Performance of first loans 
 
Borrower pays late fees 
> 1% of principal
Loan more than 2 
months delinquent
Average loan size per 
borrower 
Individual loans                                                      
Treatment Effect -0.053 0.008 648
(4.12)** (0.55) (1.12)
Observations 12792 12792 12792
R-squared 0.02 0.01 0.02
Number of branches 36 36 36
Mean of dependent variable 0.23 0.08 6863.57




Observations 5412 5412 5412
R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.05
Number of branches 35 35 35
Mean of dependent variable 0.13 0.11 3933
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
All regressions run with branch & month fixed effects, robust standard errors clustered at branch   
 
Table 1b.  Impact of bureau on screening borrowers in and out 
 






Leaving Fraction leaving Fraction leaving Fraction leaving
First time screened 0.1765 0.1894 -0.4090
(8.53)** (6.76)** (7.33)**
Subsequent screenings -0.0633 -0.0054 -0.1935
(1.61) (0.64) (2.91)**
Observations 14389 56132 56132
R-squared 0.04 0.05 0.04
Number of branches 33 33 33
Entering Fraction entering Fraction entering Fraction entering
ITE 0.1687 -0.0104 0.1828
(4.82)** (2.60)** (4.06)**
Observations 11630 56132 56132
R-squared 0.04 0.04 0.05
Number of branches 33 33 33    
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Table 2.  Intensive margin of staggered rollout:  Performance of ongoing borrowers 
 
Borrower pays late fees 
> 1% of principal
Loan more than 2 
months delinquent
Average loan size per 
borrower 
Individual loans
Treatment Effect 0.029 0.022 618
(1.79) (3.42)** (2.10)*
Observations 11117 11117 11117
R-squared 0.04 0.02 0.19
Number of borrowers 3235 3235 3235
Mean of dep. variable 0.120 0.020 8207
Solidarity Group loans                                                                     
Treatment Effect -0.001 0.012 1344
(0.04) (1.55) (6.66)**
Observations 9057 9057 9057
R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.30
Number of group loans 1216 1216 1216
Mean of dep. variable 0.05 0.03 6719
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
All regressions run with individual and month fixed effects, dummies for loan cycle, robust standard errors 
clustered at branch level.    
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Table 3.  Impacts of the bureau on the future behavior of newly selected borrowers 
 




Growth in size of 
subsequent individual loan
Individual loans
Treatment effect 0.228 -0.121 0.12
(8.58)** (1.79) (2.27)*
Observations 12792 5686 5686
R-squared 0.12 0.04 0.05
Mean of dependent variable 0.44 1.99 1.37
Number of branches 36 36 36
Solidarity Group loans
Treatment effect 0.071 0.09 0.046
(1.11) (0.58) (0.42)
Observations 4782 2631 2631
R-squared 0.17 0.05 0.08
Mean of dependent variable 0.55 1.59 1.37
Number of branches 35 35 35
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
All regressions run with branch & month fixed effects, robust standard errors clustered at branch level.  
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Average loan size 
per capita (Qz)
Treatment effect 2.513 22,957 0.964 1,612 3.084 1,933
(8.46)** (7.27)** (4.86)** (4.26)** (4.57)** (9.90)**
R-squared 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.08
Mean of dep. variable 2.42 20,876 1.54 4,123 4.23 1,160
Pre-existing borrowers
Treatment effect -0.641 -5,716
(1.50) (0.65)
R-squared 0.08 0.06
Mean of dep. variable 4.7 66,887
All borrowers
Treatment effect 1.872 17,242
(3.25)** (1.72)
R-squared 0.10 0.07
Mean of dep. variable 7.12 87,763
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
All regressions include credit officer and time fixed effects, robust standard errors clustered at branch level.
New borrowers
Individual loans Group loans
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% of treated in 
selected
Chimaltenango 141 209 25 18 71
Cuilapa 104 28 49 27 54
Santa Lucia 122 37 71 41 58
Salama 175 128 60 37 62
Poptun 95 69 38 38 99
El Estor 22 0 82 50 61




Table 6.  Comparison of pre-treatment covariates 
 
Solidarity Groups Communal Banks
Group characteristic:














Loan amount per capita 830 844 14 311 297 -13
   (in US$) [66] [58] (0.15) [9] [8] (3.19)
Percent divorced 1.48 1.40 -0.07 1.63 0.00 -1.63
[0.57] [0.52] (0.10) [0.89] [0.00] (1.84)
Percent widowed 4.11 4.81 0.69 4.40 8.12 3.72
[0.52] [1.51] (0.41) [1.24] [1.71] (1.87)
Average education
1 1.06 1.05 -0.01 0.72 0.66 -0.05
[0.05] [0.02] (0.25) [0.05] [0.04] (1.84)
Percent female 42.17 45.56 3.38 100.00 100.00
[3.13] [2.37] (1.09) [0.00] [0.00]
Average age 37.89 37.60 -0.29 37.73 38.14 0.40
[0.89] [1.27] (0.45) [0.74] [0.95] (0.38)
Percent indigenous 57.66 61.27 3.62
[8.17] [9.20] (0.91)
Percent rural  23.72 26.94 3.21
[10.29] [6.96] (0.68)
Number of observations 214 233 176 127
Standard errors in brackets, absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses; t-tests compare mean values of selected groups 




Table 7.  Comparison of pre-treatment outcomes 
 
Outcome












Borrowers pays late fees > 1% of principal 9.21 3.33 -5.88 1.36 -7.86
[2.40] [0.48] (2.27) [0.44] (3.18)
Loan more than 2 months delinquent 12.03 2.25 -9.78 0.72 -11.31
[4.12] [0.69] (2.20) [0.30] (2.73)
Observations 672 877 586
All outcomes in percent.
Standard errors in brackets; absolute value of t statistics in parentheses; t-tests compare group outcomes for selected or










Borrowers pays late fees > 1% of principal -4.20 0.80 2.70
(1.24) (0.31) (1.21)
Loan more than 2 months delinquent -4.00 -2.00 0.60
(1.04) (1.57) (0.28)
Observations 1233 669 2286
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses;  
Analysis conducted at the loan level, with group and time fixed effects. 
All coefficients multiplied by 100.
(Two pre-treatment periods)
False Treatment Effects
(Non-compliers versus control 
groups)
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Table 9.  Discontinuous impacts of information within a loan cycle 
 
Mean value  Mean value Difference
Outcome: ITE Control Selected ITE
Solidarity Groups:
Delinquent payment
1 -4.99 27.67 9.98 -17.70
(1.50) [7.53] [1.92] (2.45)
Amount of late fees (US$) -0.47 9.02 1.17 -7.85
(0.36) [6.37] [0.68] (1.19)
Number of observations  4711 175 266  
Communal Banks:
Delinquent payment
1 0.41 10.67 7.31 3.37
(0.54) [4.15] [1.19] (0.76)
Amount of late fees (US$) -0.17 1.22 0.72 -0.49
(1.36) [5.79] [0.22] (0.60)
Number of observations  3739 192 168  
1 Coefficients multiplied by 100.
Final payment only
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses, standard errors clustered at the branch level in brackets;
Analysis conducted at the loan payment level, using loans that were active at the time of the treatment.  Regressions on 








Table 10.  Impact of information across loan cycles 
 
All All All All SG CB
Outcome ITE TET ITE TET ITE ITE
Borrowers pays late fees > 1% of principal -6.27 -7.98 -1.92 -3.24 -3.35 -1.93
(1.20) (1.58) (0.68) (1.46) (0.99) (1.11)
Loan more than 2 months delinquent -9.90 -11.48 -3.69 -4.58 -6.46 -0.01
(1.77) (2.00) (1.37) (1.77) (1.53) (0.00)
Observations 3857 3191 3857 3191 2466 1391
1 Coefficients multiplied by 100.  
Group fixed effects OLS DID
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses, standard errors clustered at the branch level. 
Analysis conducted at the loan level, with time fixed effects.
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Table 11.  Correlations between group repayment and individual characteristics in 
Solidarity Groups 
 
Borrower pays late fees > 1% of 
principal
Loan more than 2 months 
delinquent
Number of members 1.65 0.07
(1.33) (0.03)
Divorced ratio -2.87 20.52
(1.13) (1.21)
Widowed ratio -6.78 -0.63
(2.22) (0.07)
Average education 3.64 0.16
(1.52) (0.21)
Female ratio -0.58 -0.44
(0.70) (0.24)
Average age -0.86 -1.18
(7.46)** (3.32)*
Average age squared 0.01 0.02
(5.31)** (3.39)*
Banking w/ Crediref institution ratio -3.41 -2.55
(2.22) (3.27)*
Observations 1230 1230
All coefficients are multiplied by 100.




Table 12.  Compositional impacts of information 
 
New clients Dropouts New clients Dropouts
ITE ITE ITE ITE
Number of members 0.32 0.04 0.19 -0.08
(1.01) (0.50) (0.69) (1.66)
Percent divorced -1.25 0.93 -0.67 -5.97
(1.77) (0.08) (2.25) (0.84)
Percent widowed -4.27 0.93 -1.52 -5.97
(0.83) (0.08) (0.95) (0.84)
Average education 0.03 0.05 -0.07 0.06
(0.55) (0.27) (2.98) (0.49)
Percent female -17.32 7.38 -5.41 12.35
(1.79) (1.95) (1.96) (3.40)
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses.
Branch-level fixed effects 
Analysis conducted at the loan level, using time fixed effects.  Each regression run 
separately to explain the number or the average characteristic of new / dropout clients 
for the loan.
OLS DID 
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Table 13.  Impact of information on change in outside borrowing 
 
 Number of 
clients
Change in number of 
loans Start taking outside loan 
All clients
Control groups 0.261 0.363
(1.64) (6.34)
ITE 5419 0.077 0.107
(1.77) (2.64)
By type of clients
Solidarity Group member
Control groups 0.359 0.364
(8.50) (11.77)
ITE 1247 -0.038 0.083
(0.25) (1.00)
Communal Bank member
Control groups 0.232 0.363
(1.15) (5.00)
ITE 4172 0.110 0.114
(2.15) (3.40)
Heterogeneity among Communal Bank members
Less experienced clients - ITE 2717 0.120 0.161
(2.98) (4.39)
More experienced clients - ITE 1455 0.145 0.025
(0.97) (0.83)
Good client - ITE 3572 0.127 0.112
(2.21) (4.59)
Bad client - ITE 600 0.037 0.130
(0.37) (1.55)
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses.
Analysis at the client level; OLS of change in outside borrowing, with standard errors clustered at the branch 
level. Experienced (less experienced) clients are clients having had at least 4 (less than 4) loans with Genesis. 
Good (bad) clients had no (at least one) delinquent repayment before.
 
   
  
43






Pre-post change  in 
control groups ITE
All 4811 0.170 -0.109 0.002
(0.11)
By type of clients
Solidarity Group members 1314 0.197 -0.125 -0.063
(1.27)
Communal Bank members 3497 0.160 -0.103 0.021
(1.77)
Heterogeneity among Communal Bank members
Experienced clients 1658 0.155 -0.079 -0.020
   (4 or more loans inside)  (2.81)
Less experienced clients 1839 0.169 -0.126 0.043
   (3 or less loans inside)  (1.79)
Analysis at the loan level, with time and branch fixed effects and  standard errors clustered at the branch level. Absolute 
value of t-statistics in parentheses
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